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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Tonin Pllumi (“Pllumi”)1 is a native and citizen of
Albania who entered the United States illegally and has been
found removable pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
1

Throughout the Administrative Record (“AR”),
Mr. Pllumi is referred to as having the last name “Pllumaj.”
See, e.g. AR at 111. However, the IJ and BIA decisions, as
well as his own brief, use the last name “Pllumi.” We will
therefore refer to the petitioner as Pllumi.
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Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Pllumi has filed a petition for review
based on the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) of his motion asking the BIA to reopen his
immigration proceedings and reconsider its decision declining
to grant him asylum. The BIA denied his motion as untimely
and chose not to exercise its authority to reopen the case sua
sponte. Pllumi claims that the decision not to reopen requires
remand because the BIA abused its discretion in determining
that he had failed to demonstrate changed country conditions,
and because the BIA predicated its refusal to reopen on the
erroneous belief that healthcare concerns cannot be a basis for
asylum. Although we conclude that the first of those
arguments is meritless, there may be merit in the second.
Because the basis upon which the BIA declined to exercise its
authority to reopen sua sponte is unclear, we will grant the
petition for review and remand so that the BIA can clarify its
decision.
I.

Background

Pllumi filed his original application for asylum and
withholding of removal on June 19, 2002. In 2005, he
supplemented that application and added a claim under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In support of his
application, Pllumi asserted that he had suffered persecution
because of his active support of Albania’s Democratic Party
and because he is Catholic. Further, Pllumi alleged that he
feared he would again be persecuted for his political and
religious beliefs if he were returned to Albania. Ultimately,
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied him all relief, holding
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that Pllumi had failed to establish past persecution or a wellfounded fear of future persecution.2
Pllumi appealed that decision and, on June 28, 2007,
the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that, even if
Pllumi were credible, he had not established a well-founded
fear of persecution and thus had failed to establish his
eligibility for relief. In its decision, the BIA also determined
that Pllumi was ineligible for humanitarian asylum under
either subsection (A) or (B) of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)
because, first, any persecution he had suffered in the past was
not so severe as to constitute a “compelling reason” under
subsection (A) for Pllumi to be unwilling or unable to return
to his home country and, second, he had failed to establish
that, as required by subsection (B), he would be subject to
“other serious harm” upon removal. Because Pllumi had not
established asylum eligibility, it followed that he had “also
failed to satisfy the higher burden of proof required for
withholding of removal.” (AR at 127.) Additionally, the BIA
held that Pllumi did not qualify for CAT protection because

2

More particularly, the IJ found that Pllumi was not
credible and thus, through testimony alone, was unable to lay
the required foundation to establish past persecution. In
addition, the IJ said that the persecution Pllumi allegedly
suffered was no different than conditions suffered by all nonelite Albanians during the time in question and thus could not
sustain a grant of asylum. The IJ also held that, even
assuming that Pllumi’s allegations established past
persecution, changed country conditions – namely the
Democratic Party’s rise to power – rebutted any presumption
of future persecution.

4

he had failed to establish that it was more likely than not he
would be tortured upon return to Albania.
On September 17, 2009, Pllumi filed the motion that is
the subject of this petition for review. He argued that, based
upon evidence that he would suffer serious harm upon
removal, the BIA should reopen his immigration proceedings
and reconsider its prior decision. Specifically, Pllumi argued
that he is entitled to humanitarian asylum because, regardless
of whether he showed he had been or would be persecuted, he
would suffer “other serious harm” if he were sent back to
Albania because he would have to rely on Albania’s
healthcare system, which he says is poorer than the United
States’ system and insufficient to treat severe injuries he
sustained in a hit-and-run car accident. He contended that the
harm he faced from substandard medical care warranted the
BIA’s exercise of its authority to sua sponte reopen
proceedings, even if his motion to reopen was deemed
untimely. Pllumi also argued that the BIA should reopen his
proceedings based on changed country conditions in
Albania.3
On October 30, 2009, the BIA denied Pllumi’s motion
to reopen and reconsider, holding that it was untimely.4 As to
3

To substantiate his fear of returning to Albania, he
provided letters allegedly written by Albanian officials
indicating that Socialist Party members and sympathizers
continued to threaten and place psychological pressure on
members of the Democratic Party.
4

As explained more fully herein, motions to
reconsider and motions to reopen must be filed within 30

5

Pllumi’s argument of harm from substandard healthcare, the
BIA said:
Pllumi’s “concerns about his future healthcare on his
return to Albania are not relevant to his persecution
claim. We separately note that the respondent may
address a request for humanitarian parole for medical
treatment to the DHS, as requests for deferred action
are within the jurisdiction of DHS, not the Immigration
Courts or this Board.”
(AR at 4.) The BIA concluded that Pllumi had “not presented
an exceptional situation which would warrant reopening” and
declined to exercise its authority to reopen his case sua
sponte.
Pllumi has petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision
that he failed to demonstrate changed country conditions such
that he would be eligible for reopening under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Alternatively, he contends that his petition
should be granted because the BIA’s refusal to sua sponte
reopen his proceedings is predicated on an error of law.

days and 90 days respectively of the date of entry of a final
administrative judgment. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The time limit for a motion to
reopen, however, does not apply if the motion relates to an
asylum application that is based upon changed country
conditions and is supported by evidence that is material and
was unavailable and could not have been discovered or
presented at the earlier proceeding.
8 U.S.C.
§
1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).
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II.

Standard of Review

In immigration cases, we review a denial of a motion
to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion,
regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request for
relief. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992);
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003).
We give the BIA’s decision broad deference and generally do
not disturb it unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to
law.” Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citation and quotation omitted).
However, motions that ask the BIA to sua
sponte reopen a case5 are of a different character. Because
such motions are committed to the unfettered discretion of the
BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and
how to exercise that discretion.6 Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft,
320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, in Mahmood
v. Holder the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
5

It seems a contradiction in terms to speak of motions
seeking sua sponte action, since “sua sponte” means the
doing of something “without prompting or suggestion,”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 2009), but that is
the terminology.
6

The Supreme Court in Kucana v. Holder specifically
declined to express an “opinion on whether federal courts
may review the Board’s decision not to reopen removal
proceedings sua sponte.” --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 n.
18 (2010). Thus, Kucana does not disturb our precedent
dictating that we generally lack jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte.

7

Circuit suggested that there is jurisdiction to remand to the
BIA for reconsideration when the BIA’s decision to decline to
exercise its sua sponte authority is based on a misperception
of the relevant law. 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). In
Mahmood, the petitioner, a native of Pakistan, filed for an
adjustment of status after his marriage to a U.S. citizen. Id. at
467-68. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
found that the marriage had been entered into for “the
purpose of evading the immigration laws” and, as a result,
declined to adjust Mahmood’s status. Id. at 468. Mahmood
was then granted a 120-day voluntary departure period with
an alternative order of removal to Pakistan. Id. During that
period, Mahmood divorced his first wife and, shortly
thereafter, married another U.S. citizen and filed a motion to
reopen his removal proceedings. Id. He also sought to stay
his voluntary departure, saying, “he would not have agreed to
[it] had he understood the terms.” Id. The IJ held that
Mahmood’s motion was untimely and that sua sponte
reopening would be futile because Mahmood was barred from
adjustment of status for a period of ten years because of his
prior failure to depart. Id. Mahmood then filed an appeal,
which the BIA dismissed for essentially the same reasons. Id.
at 469.
Later, the Supreme Court in Dada v. Mukasey, 554
U.S. 1 (2008), held that an alien could unilaterally withdraw
from voluntary departure so as to pursue a motion to reopen.
Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 470. That meant that Mahmood’s
stated desire to retract his decision to voluntarily depart
would not have resulted in a ten-year bar to an adjustment of
his status, as the BIA and IJ had thought when denying the
motion to reopen. In light of Dada, the Second Circuit
determined that it was error for the IJ and BIA to assume that

8

Mahmood’s failure to timely depart from the United States
“conclusively barred an adjustment of his status” and thus sua
sponte reopening was not necessarily futile. Id. at 467.
Recognizing that it generally lacked jurisdiction to review the
BIA’s decision to deny sua sponte reopening, the Second
Circuit nevertheless remanded the case so that the BIA could
reconsider it in light of Dada. Id. at 467, 471. The Court
decided it could exercise jurisdiction “where the Agency may
have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it
misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly,
that a reopening would necessarily fail.” Id. at 469.
We have not previously had occasion to consider
whether a question of law arising in the context of a request
for sua sponte reopening, as was implicated in Mahmood,
gives rise to our jurisdiction. As noted earlier, we typically
cannot review a BIA decision to deny sua sponte reopening.
That jurisdictional limitation is a product of precedent noting
that there is simply no meaningful standard against which
such a decision can be judged, because the BIA can make the
decision for practically any reason at all;7 its discretion is
7

“No language in the [regulation enabling the BIA to
reopen a proceeding sua sponte] requires the BIA to reopen a
deportation proceeding under any set of particular
circumstances.” Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475 (emphasis
added) (quoting Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.
1999)). The BIA is generally allowed to reopen a case sua
sponte in “exceptional situations” but no case has been found
nor any pointed out by the parties that defines what is
considered an “exceptional situation.” But cf. Cruz v. Att’y
Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that a
claim under In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003),
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essentially complete.8 Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 474-75; see
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).
However, the discretionary character of a decision to
reopen sua sponte does not mean that we are powerless to
point out when a decision is based on a false legal premise.
Mahmood demonstrates that, and we adopt the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in that regard. If the reasoning given for a
decision not to reopen sua sponte reflects an error of law, we
have the power and responsibility to point out the problem,
even though ultimately it is up to the BIA to decide whether it
will exercise its discretion to reopen. We therefore conclude
that, when presented with a BIA decision rejecting a motion
for sua sponte reopening, we may exercise jurisdiction to the
limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied on an
incorrect legal premise. In such cases we can remand to the
BIA so it may exercise its authority against the correct “legal
background.” Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469. On remand, the
BIA would then be free to deny or grant reopening sua
sponte, and we would have no jurisdiction to review that
decision.
involving the invalidation of a criminal conviction used to
support the alien’s removal charge has regularly been treated
as an “exceptional situation” warranting sua sponte
reopening, and stating that, “[w]here there is a consistent
pattern of administrative decisions on a given issue, we would
expect the BIA to conform to that pattern or explain its
departure from it”).
8

We have no occasion now to consider whether there
are constitutional boundaries that make such discretion less
than entirely complete.
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Here, it appears that the BIA may indeed have
misperceived the relevant law. We will therefore exercise
jurisdiction to review the reasoning behind the BIA’s refusal
to sua sponte reopen Pllumi’s proceedings.
III.

Discussion9
A.

Timeliness of Pllumi’s Motion

Before considering the issue of sua sponte reopening,
we address the timeliness of Pllumi’s motion to reconsider
and to reopen his proceedings, and we briefly examine the
sufficiency of the evidence he proffered on changed country
conditions. A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30
days of the entry of the final administrative order of removal.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B). Such a motion must claim “errors
of law or fact” in the BIA’s prior decision and be supported
by pertinent authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(b)(1). The operative statute and regulation provide
no exception to the time limitations on filing a motion to
reconsider.
Motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the
entry of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). In contrast to the fixed time limit on a
motion for reconsideration, however, the time limit for a
motion to reopen does not apply if the motion relates to an
asylum application and is based upon changed country
9

The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252.
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conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not
available and could not have been discovered or presented at
the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). The burden of proof on a motion to
reopen is on the alien to establish eligibility for the requested
relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620
F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the BIA may deny a
motion to reopen if it determines the alien has not established
a prima facie case for the relief sought).
The BIA issued a final administrative order in Pllumi’s
case on June 28, 2007. Pllumi’s combined motion to reopen
and reconsider was not brought until September 17, 2009,
well past the 30- and 90-day deadlines applicable to
reopening and reconsideration respectively. Thus, the BIA
correctly decided that Pllumi’s motion was untimely, unless
he proved with appropriate evidence that an adverse change
in country conditions warranted reopening the case as to
asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).
The BIA concluded that he did not, saying, “[the] evidence
submitted does not demonstrate meaningfully changed
conditions in Albania pertinent to [Pllumi’s] claim from the
conditions in Albania when the case was before the
Immigration Judge in 2005.” (AR at 4.)
The evidence Pllumi presented included letters from
various individuals in Albania indicating that the area in
which Pllumi’s hometown was located was “under
psychological pressures … by left extremists” (AR at 107),
and that his hometown itself was from time to time terrorized
by Socialists due to lack of police services (AR at 105).
Those letters, however, do not indicate “meaningfully
changed country conditions” after 2005, when the case was
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before the IJ. (AR at 4.) Rather, they suggest that the
conditions described have persisted. The other evidence
proffered by Pllumi is no more convincing.10 The BIA did
not abuse its discretion in deciding that Pllumi’s evidence of
changed country conditions failed to support reopening his
proceedings.
B.

The BIA’s Refusal to Sua Sponte Reopen

Even though Pllumi’s motion to reopen and reconsider
was untimely, the BIA retains the discretion to reopen his
proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). As earlier
noted, the BIA said the following when it declined to reopen
Pllumi’s case:
Pllumi’s “concerns about his future healthcare
on his return to Albania are not relevant to his
persecution claim. We separately note that the
respondent may address a request for
humanitarian parole for medical treatment to the
DHS, as requests for deferred action are within
the jurisdiction of DHS, not the Immigration
Courts or this Board.”
(App. at 4.) This can be read as disclaiming any power to
reopen immigration proceedings if the argument for
10

For example, Pllumi submitted information issued
by the United States Department of State in 2005 and 2009
respectively that indicates little has changed in Albania
during that time period. Further, it appears that the
Democratic Party remains in power and that the country has
made progress in improving its economic conditions.
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reopening bears on the adequacy of healthcare in the country
of removal.
If that is what the BIA meant, it has
misapprehended the breadth of its own authority.
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) the BIA can grant
relief to an applicant who has suffered past persecution but
does not face a reasonable possibility of future persecution.
Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 595 (3d Cir. 2009).11
That particular avenue of relief is typically called
humanitarian asylum and it is available upon a showing of at
least one of two types of circumstances: either that “[t]he
applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being
unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the
severity of
the
past persecution[,]”
8 C.F.R.
12
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A),
or that the applicant “has
established that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she
may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that
11

The regulation at issue in Sheriff was actually 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) but reads identically to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). The latter is a duplication of the
former as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as
amended, which transferred the functions of the INS to the
Department of Homeland Security. 68 F.R. 9824-01. Those
two “provisions relate to both the INS and [the Executive
Office for Immigration Review] and are so interrelated that
no simple division of jurisdiction is possible” and thus
duplication was required. Id.
12

That category of asylum – one based on past
persecution alone – is sometimes referred to as “Matter of
Chen” asylum due to its treatment in the case In re Matter of
Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989).
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country[,]” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Only the latter
type of humanitarian asylum, that based on “other serious
harm,” is at issue here.
We have determined that “other serious harm” means
“harm that may not be inflicted on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political group, but harm so serious as to equal the severity of
persecution.” Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation
marks omitted). We have noted the Department of Justice’s
position that economic disadvantage and the inability to
practice one’s chosen profession are examples of harms that
do not qualify as “other serious harm” in the context of
humanitarian asylum. Id.
“While those two examples may not pass muster” as
“other serious harm,” we have considered possible situations
that would. Id. For example, we have cited a decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluding that debilitation and homelessness “appear[ed] to
constitute serious harms for the purposes of” 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Id. (quoting Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey,
540 F.3d 555, 577 (7th Cir. 2008)). In that case, the
underlying facts were that the petitioner, if returned to Russia,
would be without the only medications that controlled his
mental illness and would thus be incapable of functioning on
his own and unable to obtain housing and medical treatment.
Kholyavskiy, 540 F.3d at 577. Because it appeared that the
petitioner’s situation might be one that would qualify as
“serious harm,” the Seventh Circuit remanded to the BIA for
further consideration on that issue because neither the IJ nor
the BIA had explored the availability of the “other serious
harm” variety of humanitarian asylum. Id.
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Just as debilitation and homelessness resulting from
the unavailability of specific medications arguably fall within
the ambit of “other serious harm,” id., it is conceivable that,
in extreme circumstances, harm resulting from the
unavailability of necessary medical care could constitute
“other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).
We hasten to add and to emphasize that we are not suggesting
that differing standards of healthcare around the world are, in
themselves, a basis for asylum. We are only holding that the
issue of health care is not off the table in the asylum context,
as the BIA seemed to say when it remarked that “[Pllumi’s]
concerns about his future healthcare on his return to Albania
are not relevant.” (App. at 4) On the contrary, it is within the
BIA’s authority to consider health concerns and associated
“harms” resulting from deportation when it exercises its
discretion in deciding whether to grant humanitarian asylum.
To the extent, then, that the BIA considered Pllumi’s health
issues irrelevant to its decision on sua sponte reopening
because it thought those issues could not be considered, it
erred.13
13

Our conclusion here does not affect in any way our
rejection of the proposition that a lack of healthcare in a
petitioner’s home country can serve as a basis for relief under
the CAT. As we explained in Pierre v. Attorney General, 528
F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), that is because, under the
governing regulations, an act only constitutes torture if it is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third
person information or a confession, punishing
him or her for an act he or she or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
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Given the possibility that the BIA mistakenly thought
it did not have the authority to consider Pllumi’s health
concerns as “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), we will follow Mahmood and remand
to the BIA for clarification of the basis for its decision
declining to exercise its discretion to reopen Pllumi’s case. If
the BIA “misperceived the legal background” for its exercise
of discretion, Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469, it should now take
its full authority into account. We note that, though it is
within the BIA’s jurisdiction to consider Pllumi’s health
concerns, the BIA is not required to find that those concerns
qualify as “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), and nothing we have said here should
be taken as implying otherwise. If on remand the BIA
declines to exercise its sua sponte authority but does so in a
manner that does not indicate a misunderstanding of its
authority, then that decision will be unreviewable.

her or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). In short, the CAT
“requires a showing of specific intent before the court can
make a finding that a petitioner will be tortured.” Id. The
pain and hardship that an alien subject to removal may suffer
because of inadequate healthcare in the country of removal
are “unintended consequence[s] [that are] not the type of
proscribed purpose[s] contemplated by CAT.” Id.
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IV.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons we will grant Pllumi’s
petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand to the
BIA for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
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